Towards a secure human-and-computer mutual authentication protocol by Radke, Ken et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Radke, Kenneth, Boyd, Colin, Gonzalez Nieto, Juan M., & Brereton, Mar-
got (2012) Towards a secure human-and-computer mutual authentication
protocol. In Pieprzyk, Josef & Thomborson, Clark (Eds.) Proceedings of
the Tenth Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2012), Aus-
tralian Computer Society Inc, Melbourne, Vic., pp. 39-46.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/57928/
c© Copyright 2012 The Australian Computer Society Inc
The series is published by, and most papers are copyright of, the Australian
Computer Society Inc. Reproduction for academic research and not-for-
profit purposes is granted provided the copyright notice on the first page
of each paper is included.
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Towards a Secure Human-and-Computer Mutual Authentication
Protocol
Kenneth Radke1,2 Colin Boyd1 Juan Gonzalez Nieto1 Margot Brereton2
1 Information Security Institute
2 School of Design
Queensland University of Technology
Email: {k.radke, c.boyd, j.gonzaleznieto, m.brereton} @qut.edu.au
Abstract
We blend research from human-computer interface
(HCI) design with computational based crypto-
graphic provable security. We explore the notion of
practice-oriented provable security (POPS), moving
the focus to a higher level of abstraction (POPS+)
for use in providing provable security for security
ceremonies involving humans. In doing so we high-
light some challenges and paradigm shifts required to
achieve meaningful provable security for a protocol
which includes a human. We move the focus of secu-
rity ceremonies from being protocols in their context
of use, to the protocols being cryptographic building
blocks in a higher level protocol (the security cere-
mony), which POPS can be applied to. In order to
illustrate the need for our approach, we analyse both a
protocol proven secure in theory, and a similar proto-
col implemented by a financial institution, from both
HCI and cryptographic perspectives.
Keywords: Ceremony, human, HTTPS, TLS, secu-
rity, privacy, provable security, authentication
1 Introduction
Humans have had a need to communicate securely
for thousands of years, with documented evidence of
the use of a scytale (used for transposition ciphers)
as early as 475BC (Mollin 2005). With the prolifera-
tion of computers over the last half century, and the
capacity computers provide for cryptanalysis, calcula-
tions in confidentiality-ensuring cipher schemes have
quickly become too complex for the general populace
to complete by hand. This has led to a situation
where trust is required by the general user with re-
gards to whether their communication and assets re-
main private and secure. For example, typical crypto-
graphic security solutions may include hash functions.
The general populace is unaware what hash functions
are, they certainly do not understand the functional-
ity they provide, and they do not know which hash
functions are being used on their behalf and which
ones are known to be insecure. We focus on mutual
authentication, using browser-based1 protocols, par-
ticularly providing the human with assurance that
they are communicating with the party they intend to
be communicating with. We blend concepts from the
Copyright c©2012, Australian Computer Society, Inc. This
paper appeared at the 10th Australasian Information Secu-
rity Conference (AISC 2012), Melbourne, Australia, January-
February 2012. Conferences in Research and Practice in In-
formation Technology (CRPIT), Vol. 125, Josef Pieprzyk and
Clark Thomborson, Ed. Reproduction for academic, not-for-
profit purposes permitted provided this text is included.
1Defined by Gajek et al. as protocols realizable within the con-
straints of commodity Web browsers (Gajek et al. 2008).
provable security community, network security com-
munity, human computer interface (HCI) design com-
munity, and sociotechnical community. Our contribu-
tion includes a presentation of deficiencies in models
and protocols previously published. We also outline
a set of minimum guidelines that human-computer
authentication protocols should have over and above
computer-computer authentication protocols.
We blend HCI research and cryptographic research
to create a useful protocol-including-a-human proving
methodology. We highlight human-centred consider-
ations which must be included when analysing such
a protocol, and outline central issues in assessing se-
curity which requires a shift in thinking. To moti-
vate our approach we analyse both a protocol proven
secure in theory, and a similar protocol deployed in
practice by a financial institution, from both HCI and
cryptographic perspectives.
2 Background and Related Work
To create a mutual authentication protocol between a
human and a computer, which is secure with respect
to the common understanding of confidentiality and
integrity2, a number of fields of research need to be
examined. The combination of an adversary having
the capabilities of a computer and one of the parties
being a computer, means that lessons learned in the
non-computer world cannot be directly applied. For
example, an attack in a physical environment (such as
a robbery) may need a success rate of, at worst, one in
ten to be worthwhile for the perpetrator; whereas in
the cyberworld attacks that work one time in a million
can be seen as successful (Shostack & Stewart 2008).
So this suggests cryptography with enough security to
withstand a computer attack is required, and yet hu-
mans are known to have neither the patience, nor the
capacity, to compute the necessarily large numerical
values required for modern cryptography. Further, if
modern cryptography is used, then the human loses
visibility, the process becomes non-transparent, and
hence, for the general populace, blind trust is required
that the data is secure.
Further, cryptography is no longer required only
by nation states, the military, or secret lovers. Today,
the general populace, in developing and first world
countries, have huge amounts of data and communi-
cations they would like protected, and there are many
real-world settings, such as smart phones, RFID tags,
and e-commerce, that require protected communi-
cation. This means that, even if we could some-
how remove the advantage that computers provide
2For definitions of authentication, integrity and confidential-
ity see (ISO/IEC 27001 Information technology - Security tech-
niques - Information security management systems - Require-
ments 2005, Menezes et al. 1996).
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the cryptanalyst over human capabilities, for exam-
ple by using CAPTCHAs (eg in (Dziembowski 2011))
or POSHs (Daher & Canetti 2008), the amount of
encrypting and decrypting required makes anything
more than human involvement in the cryptosystem
at critical authentication steps unrealistic.
In this background section, with our goal being a
secure authentication protocol which is not only us-
able by humans, but also understandable by humans
in such a way that blind trust is not required, we
will cover the ideals of provable security, security cer-
emonies3, and we will examine some HCI design and
sociotechnical considerations.
2.1 Provable Security
In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway responded to a need to
add more rigour to authentication protocol analysis
(Bellare & Rogaway 1993a). They applied reduction
techniques for proving algorithms4 to authentication
and key distribution protocols. These techniques had
been previously used by Goldwasser, Micali, Rivest,
Blum and Yao in other cryptographic primitive set-
tings ((Yao 1982, Goldwasser & Micali 1984, Blum &
Micali 1984, Goldwasser et al. 1988) cited in (Bellare
& Rogaway 1993a)). The critical concept of a reduc-
tionist proof of security is that, if an adversary can
break the protocol, then the adversary can also break
the underlying cryptographic primitive.
Perhaps a more significant contribution of Bellare
and Rogaway’s 1993 work was the concept of practice-
oriented provable security (POPS). Provable security
research prior to this had been based on only the-
oretical primitives (Bellare 1999), such that at the
time of Bellare and Rogaway’s 1993 papers provably
secure cryptographic primitives tended to be much
less efficient than primitives used in practice (Bellare
& Rogaway 1993a,b). Since there was no intersection
between provably secure cryptographic primitives and
the primitives used in practice, provable security pre-
1993 was just theory. With the addition of an ide-
alised model, the random oracle, protocols using the
primitives used in practice could have security proofs
developed.
Unfortunately, the concept behind POPS has not
extended as far as required into protocol design, par-
ticularly in the area of protocols which involve hu-
mans. A fundamental ideal of POPS is that at no
point should a protocol be able to be broken with-
out breaking the underlying cryptographic primitive,
and hence the protocol should not be weaker than
the underlying primitive. In reality, particularly with
respect to humans 5, this is not the case. For exam-
ple, humans have shown themselves to be suscepti-
ble to many social engineering attacks, which allow
the theoretically secure protocols (which have a re-
ductionist proof) to be broken in practice. Further,
humans do not execute a protocol as the protocol de-
signer thought they would. The reasons protocols,
proven secure mathematically, are broken when hu-
mans use them, can be summarised to the model used
for the security proof was insufficient. Such a state-
ment masks a variety of sources of deficiency, some of
which include:
3Ceremony (a term coined by Jesse Walker) analysis is protocol
analysis with the human interaction explicitly included (Ellison
2007).
4These reductionist proof techniques were collectively called
provable security.
5Beyond human involvement and potential social attacks, infor-
mation is leaked concerning otherwise secure protocols via means
such as observing computation time and power consumption, col-
lectively known as side-channel attacks.
• modelling a human is too difficult, and hence hu-
mans are either left out of the model and security
proof, or else humans are given unrealistic pow-
ers such as being expected to follow the protocol
100% correctly, 100% of the time; or they are
expected to completely forget previous actions.
• The model, and hence the security proof of the
protocol, does not include critical out-of-band
(OOB)6 communication and necessary setup
steps prior to the protocol running.
• The protocol definition, and hence the security
proof based on the model, does not include the
complete design (for one example, see Section
3.1). Most particularly, decisions that affect se-
curity, particularly HCI decisions, are left out of
the protocol definition and are hence being made
by non-security-aware practitioners.
Two promising directions in the provable security
community have been made by Hopper and Blum
(Hopper & Blum 2001), and by Gajek et al. (Gajek
et al. 2008). Hopper and Blum’s contribution was
to provide a goal of creating (α, β, t) protocols for
use by humans, in which at least (1 − α) of the hu-
man population can do what they need to do, in at
most t seconds, with probability of correct execution
of the protocol greater than (1− β). This data could
be collected empirically, and their idea was to create
light-weight cryptographic protocols that would have
a mathematical proof of security, with ideally 90% of
the population executing the protocol correctly inside
10 seconds, 90% of the time (Hopper & Blum 2001).
Unfortunately, the protocol they suggested resulted
in 10% of the population executing the protocol cor-
rectly inside 300 seconds, 80% of the time, and has
gone on to become the basis of light-weight protocols
for constrained devices, such as RFID, rather than
human executable protocols (for example, see (Juels
& Weis 2005, Hammouri & Sunar 2008, Bringer et al.
2006)). However, the concept of combining empir-
ical evidence of usability with a security proof is a
promising direction.
Secondly, Gajek et al. presented a protocol for mu-
tual authentication between a human and an online
institution, via the web (Gajek et al. 2008). This pro-
tocol, discussed in depth in section 3.1 and the basis
of our proposal, has a number of innovative and use-
ful features. Firstly, for the purposes of the security
proof, the human is separated from their computer
and web browser, so that the authentication between
the human and a server has three parties, being the
human, the human’s computer with a web-browser,
and the server. Secondly, the human and the human’s
computer are given specific functions in the security
proof model. These functions were that the browser
on the human’s computer renders a webpage (based
on browser state), and the human must be able to
recognise what Gajek et al. called a human perceptible
authenticator (HPA) (Gajek et al. 2008). The HPA
can be anything, but in the Gajek et al. protocol the
HPA was an image which was previously selected by
the user and sent to the server. By adding these func-
tions, the human’s involvement is partitioned from
the non-human protocol messages, and a formal proof
of security is created. The proof concludes with the
security of the protocol being bounded by the proba-
bility of a human to recognise their previously chosen
HPA from the set of all possible values (specifically
6Out-of-band channels are auxiliary channels, such as receiving
an email which must be responded to as part of a signup process
on a website.
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taking into account other values which a human would
find indistinguishable from their chosen HPA).
This technique of creating a protocol proof with
the human assumptions being included but parti-
tioned in such a way that a human trial will inform
how secure the protocol is, is a significant step for-
ward in the quest to prove protocols secure for hu-
man use. However, a complete design, informed by
iterative cumbersome protocol-specific human stud-
ies following each new protocol design and developed
proof, would potentially take years with no guaran-
tee of success. Human protocols do need to be verified
via human trial post-theoretical proof, however sim-
ply writing a security proof in terms of the human
is not sufficient and a method of arriving at a more
likely to succeed design is required.
Modern cryptography has matured enough, and a
necessity for provably secure human-computer proto-
cols has become critical, such that a timely paradigm
shift concerning the building blocks of secure proto-
cols is required. Just as Bellare and Rogaway de-
fined POPS in 1993 (Bellare & Rogaway 1993a,b),
thus shifting the focus to protocols and primitives in
use at the time (Bellare 1999), we propose that there
is now a requirement for a further paradigm shift,
to move to a higher level of abstraction. That is, to
treat building blocks for human interaction protocols,
such as HTTPS, as primitives, and to create security
proofs based on that in the interests of creating proto-
cols better suited to humans. In this way, we propose
POPS+. The technique remains the same, as does
the quality of the proof. That is, if you believe that
HTTPS is secure, and a reduction can be made from
the security of HTTPS to the security of a protocol,
then, as long as there remains no program that can
break HTTPS, the protocol will remain secure.
2.2 Ceremonies
In recent years there has been a recognition and con-
certed effort to include the social sciences in informa-
tion security in the research community7. This multi-
disciplinary approach brings into context the human
usage of information security systems. As Shostack
and Stewart state, “. . . our approach to information
security is flawed” and “the way forward cannot be
found solely in mathematics or technology” (Shostack
& Stewart 2008).
The concept of a security ceremony has been used
by Ellison, in network security settings, to capture
the human element in the protocol usage (Ellison &
Dohrmann 2003, Ellison 2007). In Ellison’s main pa-
per on the topic in 2007, the human was modelled
as another node on the network, and hence a part
of what must be considered from a security point of
view. At the time, this innovation did not lead to any
formal proofs of security, and only initial work was
presented on how the human nodes could be mod-
elled, but simply having the human as a node on
the network, distinct from their computer, allowed
certain attacks to be clearly presented and demon-
strated. Most particularly, the technique demon-
strated an attack which exploits an interface design
which hides information, that the computer has, from
the human who needs the information to give that hu-
man any hope of making an informed decision (Ellison
2007).
Since 2007, security ceremonies have been investi-
gated in the fields of formal methods, including the
PKI context, which provided some early steps on how
7As can be seen by workshops and conferences such as SHB,
WEIS, and SOUPS.
a human may be modelled (Martina & Carlos 2008,
Martina et al. 2009); in applied cryptography which
added extra human elements to allow for humans to
vouch for other humans as an extra factor in identifi-
cation (Brainard et al. 2006); and in the network se-
curity community with a focus on a defence-in-depth
approach, via use of forcing functions8 (Karlof et al.
2009).
Recent research has shown that ceremony analysis
is protocol analysis in its context of use (Radke et al.
2011). This raised concerns about conducting a more
complete analysis, in particular including humans in a
protocol’s security proof, as a method for proving the
security of the non-human part of the protocol being
investigated. For example, a protocol such as HTTPS
(HTTP over TLS), can be used in a variety of ways on
a variety of devices. If the device, method, and user
of the protocol are included in the ceremony, then
many ceremonies for HTTPS which will be widely
used have not been created yet (and the devices on
which they will be used have not been created yet).
This viewpoint means that proving the security of
HTTPS via use in a ceremony will create a proof of
security for HTTPS which is applicable to only that
ceremony.
2.3 HCI and Sociotechnical considerations
HCI research on browser-based authentication pro-
tocols has revealed much concerning what humans
can, what humans will not, and what humans can-
not, do, drawing over the years from what Harrison
et al. have identified as three broad paradigms of HCI
research – a-theoretic, cognitive and situated (Harri-
son et al. 2007). Lessons can be learned from initial
work by Simon (Simon 1969, 1996), which showed us
the boundaries of human short term recall, and cogni-
tive load issues, through to specific controlled studies
on decision making in use of security systems. An
example of such research is by Schechter et al. who
created a study in which bank websites were progres-
sively changed, to become less and less secure, and the
researchers determined whether the participants con-
tinued to enter their password into the website (which
they did) (Schechter et al. 2007). Recent work has in-
dicated that a recent security improvement, which at-
tempts to provide users with the necessary authenti-
cation information via the use of Extended Validation
Certificates9, and the associated inbuilt functionality
in current browsers to colour code and present typ-
ically real world company name information to the
user, is not being used by web-users in their web se-
curity decision making (Radke et al. 2010).
Dourish has provided a bridge between social sci-
ence and HCI design, contributing significantly in ar-
eas such as defining and using context (for example,
in Dourish (2004)). Of specific concern, when defining
context, was the impression (still common seven years
later) that context is fixed, explicit and can be ade-
quately captured by explicitly measurable informa-
tion rather than something that is “. . . being continu-
ally renegotiated and defined in the course of action”
(Dourish 2004). One simple application of the con-
cept of context is the case of the rushing user10. As
Dhamija et al. describe, security is typically not the
8A core property of a forcing function is to prevent a user from
proceeding, until a critical step is completed.
9Extended Validation SSL Certificates – The Certification Au-
thority/Browser Forum. http://www.cabforum.org/.
10A rushing user is used by Kumar et al. to describe a user who,
in a rush, takes the shortest path through a protocol, skipping steps
which are not required for subsequent steps to work (Kumar et al.
2009).
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primary task and hence users may not notice security
indicators or read warning messages (Dhamija et al.
2006). There is also a body of work which focuses
on achieving security by aligning what a system does
with the user’s mental models of that system (Smith
2003, Yee 2004). As Smith states, “Repeatedly, I
ended up with problems because what computers are
doing with cryptography doesn’t match the mental
model that humans have - end users as well as sys-
tem programmers (Smith 2003).” More recent work
includes Chiasson et al.’s research into constructing a
set of design principles for security management sys-
tems (Chiasson et al. 2007).
While the concept of aligning the actual system
to the user’s mental model of the system (or vice
versa) is useful at a guiding level along the lines of
“the user must understand what the system is do-
ing, and what the response to her actions will be,”
the concept of the human cognitive model that exists
prior to the situation is a contentious one. There is
significant evidence that people co-construct mean-
ing using embodied competencies and situational cir-
cumstances (Suchman 2007). Suchman argues under-
standing conversations and interactions, as dynamic
co-constructions, could prove more useful for design-
ers of human-machine interactions. The lesson we
take from this body of work is the necessity for the
user to be in control and to have visibility of (and
to understand and actively participate in), ideally,
the cryptographic authentication processes. This is
in keeping with the central concept of Norman’s pop-
ular design book, which is “when people have trouble
with something, it isn’t their fault - it is the fault of
the design (Norman 2002).”
3 Human Protocols
We now focus our attention on protocols involving hu-
mans, specifically two cases, from which we will draw
several critical lessons. The first case is by Gajek
et al. and describes mutual authentication via the
web, from which we will learn techniques used for
proofs (Gajek et al. 2008). The second case is a com-
parative study, by Kumar et al., for pairing methods
for previously unassociated devices over some human-
imperceptible communication channel (such as blue-
tooth). This section will show us several important
aspects of a human protocol, such as being resistant
to the already discussed rushing user (Kumar et al.
2009).
3.1 Provably Secure Browser-Based User-
Aware Mutual Authentication over TLS
In the past, it has been typical for papers analysing
human protocols to present a range of known attacks,
such as naive keylogging attacks, phishing attacks,
eavesdropping, shoulder surfing, etc, and then, in an
informal way, describe how their protocol addresses
these concerns, perhaps via statistical analysis on a
small set of users. This process remains widely used
today (for example, Oorschot & Wan (2009), Aru-
mugam & Sujatha (2010)). This is the style of pro-
tocol creation and analysis that the provable security
movement of the past twenty years has sought to su-
persede. Therefore it was a significant step, by Gajek
et al., to create a proof of security for a protocol in-
volving a human (Gajek et al. 2008). A sketch of their
protocol follows:
1. The protocol is between a server, a human’s com-
puter running a web browser (which has state),
and the human.
2. Before the protocol begins, the human has se-
lected a HPA and provided that HPA to the
server. The HPAs suggested by Gajek et al. are
a personally selected image or voice recording.
3. Both the server and the human’s computer have
authentication certificates and associated private
keys, and a secure TLS connection is estab-
lished between the browser and the server, when
the browser on the human’s computer opens the
server’s webpage. This process authenticates the
server to the human’s browser and from the hu-
man’s browser to the server.
4. The server sends the human the HPA that the
human has stored with the server (by completing
a lookup of the human’s browser-specific certifi-
cate, to know whose HPA to send), via the web
browser which renders the HPA for the user, and
this authenticates the server to the human.
5. Having recognised the HPA, the human sends the
server their traditional login and password, thus
authenticating the human to the server.
Investigation of the Gajek et al. protocol, model
and proof reveals a number of salient points. These
points may be categorised into HCI issues and cryp-
tographic issues.
3.1.1 HCI Issues
For the points of interest that can be drawn from the
Gajek et al. case, we will assume the HPA is an image
(though these comments apply equally to voice and
several other types of HPA). As stated in section 2.1,
one of the reasons protocols proven to be secure fail,
when subjected to use by a human, is due to the pro-
tocol specification not extending far enough into the
HCI implementation. Thus, HCI designers, who are
not security professionals, are making decisions that
security professionals should have made. Issues that
could result from the Gajek et al. protocol include:
1. Perhaps the most significant issue is requiring the
designer to ensure that at least the image is fully
displayed (ie images have not been turned off in
the browser, and the image is fully downloaded)
before the login and password box is presented to
the user. Otherwise, there is no authentication
from the server to the human, not even poten-
tially any authentication from the server to the
human, and authentication from the server to the
human is the aim of the protocol. This goes be-
yond the rushing user concern, which this pro-
tocol does not resist at all, since the human can
enter their login and password regardless of what
image, or whether an image, is sent.
2. As soon as multiple people send images to a
server, design decisions will be made regarding
what format to store them in, what size to store
them in, and what resolution to store them in.
This will be done to ensure only a fixed amount
of storage is used, and that similar quality im-
ages are used. The end result being that some
images (which were too small or too low qual-
ity) may be rejected, and other images will lose
significant detail.
3. Since the decisions at the client end are also
not specified, different designers of website login
forms will make different decisions about how to
display the images. These decisions include the
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shape of the image (at least, portrait or land-
scape) and the size of the image area on the web-
page, which will all impact how many HPAs are
human distinguishable from the complete set of
HPAs.
The authors have seen a variant of the Gajek et
al. protocol implemented by a financial institution.
In this real world example, the user does not have
a certificate, and instead the user’s username is sent
from the user to the bank, which the bank uses to
identify which HPA to send back to the user. Upon
the receipt of the HPA from the bank, the user sends
their traditional login and password information to
the bank.
Exploring this real world example is worthwhile
to determine the sorts of design decisions that can be
made by implementers of systems. Design decisions,
that the creators of this login ceremony have made,
include:
1. The bank’s users are presented with a set of im-
ages to choose their HPA from. That is, the bank
has overcome the issues concerning the range of
image sizes, shapes, formats, resolutions etc, by
providing the set of images to choose from. Un-
fortunately, this set of images is quite small, less
than 20, so the dictionary space |W | of this part
of the HPA is quite small.
2. The implementers have added a pass-phrase
which the users submit when they select their
image in the once-off setup stage. Both the im-
age and the passphrase (two parts to this HPA)
are sent from the bank to the human at each lo-
gin.
3. The bank’s login proceeds without the image
part of the HPA being downloaded. That is, even
if the user turns off image downloads in their
browser, the login and password entry fields still
appear and the user can still login to the system.
4. This protocol is in no way rushing-user resistant.
That is, the user can enter their login and pass-
word without looking at the HPA at all, and
hence the protocol can be completed without the
recognise task being executed.
3.1.2 Cryptographic Issues
The main cryptographic issues that surround the
Gajek et al. protocol are entwined in human issues.
From a cryptographic point of view, both security
of the channel and authentication of the two parties
is achieved by the use of HTTPS and certificates at
both ends (TLS in client authentication mode). The
reason why HPAs are used is due to the recognition
that users do not check, know to check, know how to
check, certificates. So there is an interesting combina-
tion in the security proof where effectively authenti-
cation of the user is provided by the user’s certificate
(wrapped in various cryptographic primitives such as
keyed hashes), and authentication of the server is
achieved via the HPA. This is in contrast to the words
used in the paper, which clearly and intuitively state
that TLS ensures that the browser knows it is com-
municating with the server, and the server knows that
it is communicating with the browser, at which point
the respective keys (HPA server to human; password
human to server) can be securely exchanged. Once
the HPA is recognised by the human, the server is
authenticated to the human; and once the password
is matched by the server, the human is authenticated
to the server (Gajek et al. 2008).
There are three central observations:
1. Essentially the server’s password (user’s HPA) is
being sent to the human before the human has
been authenticated. Most particularly, the sepa-
ration of the human from the human’s browser-
computer combination, means that while the
browser has been authenticated to the server
via the browser’s certificate, anyone, especially
someone other than the intended user, could be
sitting at the terminal. This would allow an ad-
versary, sitting at the user’s terminal, to acquire
the HPA and later masquerade to the user as the
server. If we are to use the HPA as a real in-
dicator of authentication and hence security of
the system, then there is no difference between
a server sending a HPA to an unauthenticated
human and a human sending a password to an
unauthenticated server. This weakness is a re-
sult of a limitation of the security model used for
the protocol proof, since these sorts of attacks
were not modelled.
2. Further, in the real world implementation, since
the human’s browser has no certificate, then the
server is sending the HPA without authentication
at the client end, ensuring replay and MITM at-
tacks11 are possible. This means that this proto-
col provides no extra security above a standard
login and password protocol with no HPA.
3. The human’s password, sent in message 5 of the
Gajek et al. protocol (see Section 3.1), does not
form part of the proof of security of the protocol.
Again, this is because the security model used
excluded the possibility of the non-intended-user
using the computer, the authentication of the
user’s browser is sufficient to authenticate the
user.
As stated earlier in sections 1 and 2, the inten-
tion is to create a protocol which is transparent to
the human that provides the human with assurance
that they are communicating with the party they in-
tend to be communicating with. Users should not be
expected to accept that the password that the bank
has for them, the HPA, is sent to them before they
have consciously provided anything to the bank to
authenticate themselves. An interesting observation
from the Gajek et al. protocol is that, if the HPA is
truly being used as the method to authenticate the
server, then the certificate, at least at the server’s
end, is not required. Indeed, if we presume that users
are not checking security certificate information as
part of their security decision making process (as evi-
denced by studies in Radke et al. (2010) and Schechter
et al. (2007)) this does suggest a shift in perspective
of where the certificate should be used. For exam-
ple, we could ensure that all banks are made aware
of certificates and check for certificates, while we can-
not ensure that all users are aware of certificates and
check for certificates, therefore the suggestion would
be to have the certificates at the user’s end (to be
issued at the same time as the login and password
information is issued to the customer by the bank).
This may involve an addition to the TLS protocol, or
can be constructed using current traditional server-
authentication methods by moving the server’s role
to the client, such that the client, who has the certifi-
cate, becomes the “server”, with one extra message
11A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is an attack where a
third party intercepts messages between two communicating par-
ties, typically without either intended party detecting this, allow-
ing the MITM attacker to listen in and manipulate messages.
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flow in the initialisation of TLS. We shall call this
mode which has a certificate at what is traditionally
considered the client end, and no certificate at what is
traditionally considered the server end, certificateless-
server mode.
We also seek to create a protocol which is rushing
user resistant, that ensures the user is actually check-
ing the authentication provided by the server, which
is not enforced in the Gajek et al. protocol. Another
lesson learned by the investigation of the Gajek et al.
protocol is the ideal that the human, rather than the
server, takes the initial steps in the protocol.
A final point on the Gajek et al. protocol is more
of a philosophical ideal. The ideal is that the human
does not know that this is the real protocol. That
is, the human is presented with a website and simply
follows the instructions - there is no necessity to pre-
learn this protocol. This raises an interesting issue,
and that is that the adversary can, instead of attack-
ing the Gajek et al. protocol directly, simply create
a new website with a new protocol (which does not
even have to be related to the real protocol). There-
fore, ideally a protocol is created which the human is
forced to initiate, and as the initiator, rather than the
follower, the human needs to learn what the protocol
should look like. This ideal, combined with trans-
parency of the authentication process, should make
the protocol substitution resistant.
3.2 Usability Testing of Human Protocols
Kumar et al. researched 13 different wireless de-
vice pairing methods (Kumar et al. 2009). While the
study used now outdated mobile telephones, several
lessons learned about how humans take part in proto-
cols can be directly applied. Wireless device pairing
typically has unavoidable human involvement, and
hence each method which typically combines cryp-
tographic elements with human interaction, is a sep-
arate non-trivial security ceremony involving a hu-
man. Kumar et al. designed and executed a human
study which, over the course of three sessions, com-
pared more than 40 (total) variations of the pairing
methods. The study’s participants were timed, had
their actions logged, completed pre- and post- ques-
tionnaires, and an interview. The security ceremonies
were assessed for robustness and usability. Robust-
ness results were categorised into safe errors12 and
fatal errors13. Usability was assessed in three cate-
gories, being: completion time; successful completion;
and user’s perception of ease-of-use and personal pref-
erence (Kumar et al. 2009).
Two outcomes of Kumar et al.’s research that are
directly applicable to human protocol design in gen-
eral. Firstly, protocols should be designed to be rush-
ing user resistant, by ensuring that a user’s responses
depend on prior steps. The user cannot just “accept”,
or, even worse, ignore. Secondly, the human initiat-
ing the protocol is important. There were other useful
conclusions, regarding what sorts of activities gener-
ate the least number of false positives and false neg-
atives, but they are more protocol specific (Kumar
et al. 2009).
12A safe error is any non-fatal error, typically a false positive,
a rejection of a successful pairing.
13A fatal error is a false negative, or the acceptance of a failed
pairing instance (as defined in (Uzun et al. 2007)).
4 Towards A Human-Computer Mutual Au-
thentication Protocol, Provably Secure in
POPS+
We target two central improvements and considera-
tions which should be included in authentication pro-
tocols involving a human. They include
1. Rushing user resistance
2. A security proof at a level above the crypto-
graphic level
4.1 Rushing user resistance
Mutual authentication, for example where a bank au-
thenticates itself to its account holder, as well as the
account holder authenticating themselves to the bank,
is important. In most protocols where an entity is au-
thenticated to a human, there will be a step similar
to the recognise function of the Gajek et al. proto-
col proof (Gajek et al. 2008). In this step, the entity
will show something (a HPA) to the human, and the
human is meant to examine this HPA and if it is cor-
rect they proceed, and if the HPA is incorrect they
should abort the protocol run. Unfortunately, as we
have shown, both in the research literature and in
commercial implementations, quite often there is no
assurance that the human has completed the recog-
nise assessment - a human who skips such a step is
called a rushing user.
To increase the chances of humans completing the
recognise step, rushing user resistance should be in-
cluded in the protocol. A construction that could be
added to most such protocols is to send the human
user not just the real HPA (HPA1), but also a false
HPA (HPA2) in random order. Now, beyond send-
ing to the server their user name and password, the
human must also select which of the two HPAs was
their HPA. If the human selects the wrong HPA, then
the server must abort the protocol even if the login
and password the human provides are correct.
There are a number of intricacies with this solu-
tion, especially when trying to combine the crypto-
graphic elements with the human elements:
• This solution does not enhance the cryptographic
security of the protocol. Rather, this step is only
in place to ensure that the human follows the
protocol. This element is not captured in current
computational-based security proofs and models.
• Beyond not enhancing the cryptographic secu-
rity, this action decreases the cryptographic se-
curity in that the adversary now has twice as
many chances of sending the human a legitimate
HPA (if only two HPAs are sent to the human)
since two HPAs are now sent to the human.
• Whether the human is completing the recognise
step is being checked by the server, in that if
the wrong HPA is selected then the server should
abort the protocol and force the human to start
again. If the server is the adversary, then the
adversary will accept the username and password
regardless of which HPA the human chooses. So
this training of the human to follow the protocol
correctly will only work while legitimate protocol
runs occur with the real server.
• The improvement to the human’s behaviour in
following the protocol will happen over time.
This is another concept not captured in current
security proofs and models.
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4.2 Security proofs at a level above the cryp-
tographic level
This paper has introduced the concept of POPS+,
being that a security ceremony is, at the level that
most security professionals consider security, simply
a protocol which includes a human. In the same way
that practice oriented provable security (POPS) of
block ciphers is not proven by examining a proto-
col including a block cipher, the POPS+ security of
a higher level cryptographic building block such as
HTTPS should not be proven by examining a pro-
tocol which includes HTTPS. The proof of HTTPS
is completed elsewhere, and, once proven secure, the
super-protocol which uses HTTPS is proven secure.
In this way we have moved beyond ceremonies being
protocols in their context of use to being protocols
which include lower level protocols.
To allow this analysis of suitability of a protocol
for human use to happen, ideal instances of the cryp-
tographic building blocks can be used. For example,
an ideal secure channel providing confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and authentication for the participant with
the private key where the other participant is known
to check the certificate, would be used for a HTTPS
secured channel. Cryptographers would argue that if
the communication channel is secure then the proto-
col becomes trivial. However, a secure channel is no
guarantee that the correct information is being passed
to and from the human, which is the focus of this level
of analysis. By assuming that cryptographic building
blocks, such as the channel, are secure, greater atten-
tion can be focused on the protocol flows that interact
with the human allowing for quicker and easier cere-
mony design and analysis.
5 Conclusion
We have drawn inspiration from a variety of sources,
including the provable security cryptographic commu-
nity, network security community, Human Computer
Interface (HCI) design community, wireless commu-
nication device pairing, and the sociotechnical com-
munity, to create generic enhancements which can be
applied to human usable human-computer mutual au-
thentication protocols. Human usable protocols were
found to require rushing user resistance, achieved by
ensuring subsequent protocol steps depended on pre-
vious protocol steps, and spoofing resistance, achieved
by ensuring transparency of the protocol to the hu-
man, necessitating the protocol be taught/learned,
and ensuring that the human initiates the protocol.
These aspects were shown to be missing in research
literature and current commercial implementations.
This paper suggests a shift in thinking regarding
ceremony analysis. Previously, ceremony analysis has
been regarded by some as a more complete version of
protocol analysis which explicitly includes human in-
teraction, setup steps and OOB communication, thus
proving a ceremony secure is proving the protocol se-
cure. Recent work has highlighted an issue with this,
regarding each ceremony as a protocol in its context
of use, meaning that proving a protocol secure in one
ceremony does not prove the protocol secure in any
other ceremony. This paper takes that a step further,
treating the underlying protocol as a cryptographic
primitive or building block, and considering the cer-
emony as a protocol which uses that building block
(protocol, such as TLS).
We have highlighted that cryptographic building
blocks, such as TLS, have become mature to the
point where a further level of abstraction is possi-
ble from the level that was applied when practice-
oriented provable security (POPS) was promoted by
Bellare and Rogaway 18 years ago. This allows, for
the security proof of security ceremonies that include
humans, to abstract away the cryptographic building
blocks and extend the security proofs into the human-
computer interface. We have called this paradigm
shift POPS+. The philosophy remains the same,
and that is, a reductionist proof such that the way
to break the protocol is to break the cryptographic
building block, and as long as the building block re-
mains secure, the protocol remains secure.
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